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Abstract
Objective: Previous studies suggest that unemployment predicts increased cardiovascular disease (CVD) risk, but whether
unemployment insurance programs mitigate this risk has not been assessed. Exploiting US state variations in
unemployment insurance benefit programs, we tested the hypothesis that more generous benefits reduce CVD risk.
Methods: Cohort data came from 16,108 participants in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) aged 50–65 at baseline
interviewed from 1992 to 2010. Data on first and recurrent CVD diagnosis assessed through biennial interviews were linked
to the generosity of unemployment benefit programmes in each state and year. Using state fixed-effect models, we
assessed whether state changes in the generosity of unemployment benefits predicted CVD risk.
Results: States with higher unemployment benefits had lower incidence of CVD, so that a 1% increase in benefits was
associated with 18% lower odds of CVD (OR:0.82, 95%-CI:0.71–0.94). This association remained after introducing US census
regional division fixed effects, but disappeared after introducing state fixed effects (OR:1.02, 95%-CI:0.79–1.31).This was
consistent with the fact that unemployment was not associated with CVD risk in state-fixed effect models.
Conclusion: Although states with more generous unemployment benefits had lower CVD incidence, this appeared to be
due to confounding by state-level characteristics. Possible explanations are the lack of short-term effects of unemployment
on CVD risk. Future studies should assess whether benefits at earlier stages of the life-course influence long-term risk of
CVD.
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Introduction
The US unemployment rate was 8.2% in early 2012, reaching
12.8 million people in January[1]. Unemployment can have
several negative consequences including loss of income and
pension benefits, increased tobacco and alcohol consumption[2–
3], and changes in physical and mental health[4–7]. In particular,
job loss during the years before retirement can critically disrupt
savings and wealth accumulation[8], and is associated with
increased risk of cardiovascular disease (CVD)[9–10]. An impor-
tant, yet unexplored question, is whether US unemployment
policies might reduce CVD risk by providing a safety net during
unemployment spells.
In the United States, the Social Security Act of 1935 created the
Federal State Unemployment Compensation Program, providing
temporary wage replacement for workers who experience invol-
untary job loss[11]. Unemployment income is a major US welfare
policy and often provides the primary source of income for
recently unemployed individuals. Several studies have examined
the association between income and CVD[12–17], but no studies
have examined whether unemployment income is associated with
reduced CVD risk.
The Federal-State Unemployment Insurance Program provides
unemployment benefits to eligible workers who are unemployed
through no fault of their own (as determined under State law), and
meet other eligibility requirements of State law. It is a complex
programme and states have flexibility along several dimensions:
Each State administers a separate unemployment insurance
program within guidelines established by Federal law. Eligibility
for unemployment insurance, benefit amount and duration are
determined by the State law under which unemployment
insurance claims are established. To be eligible, workers must
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during an established period referred to as ‘base period’, which in
most states is the first four out of the last five completed calendar
quarters prior to the time that the claim is filed. Benefits are
generally based on a percentage of an individual’s earnings over a
recent 52-week period up to a state maximum amount. In most
states, benefits can be paid for a maximum of 26 weeks, and they
are subject to Federal income taxes[18]. Unemployed workers are
most likely to benefit from the unemployment program. However,
the health benefits of unemployment income may extend to others,
by providing all workers and their families with a sense of financial
security. Given the links between psychological distress and
CVD[19–24], if reductions in financial worries alleviate depression
or anxiety, unemployment benefits may thereby lead to lower
CVD risk among the general population regardless of employment
status.
Identifying the causal effect of unemployment income is
challenging because of strong selection into unemployment: if less
healthy individuals are more likely to lose their job and claim
unemployment benefits, the association between receiving unem-
ployment income and CVD incidence would underestimate the
true effect of unemployment benefits on CVD risk. An innovative
approach to address this bias is to exploit the large variation in
unemployment policies across US states. Each state has autonomy
to define unemployment program eligibility and maximum
compensation benefits. As a result, maximum duration and
unemployment benefits vary considerably across states over the
last decades. These variations over time are independent of an
individual’s social standing or previous health and offer a unique
opportunity to examine the impact of unemployment benefits on
CVD risk.
In this paper, we aim to isolate the impact of a single feature of
the unemployment benefit programme on CVD incidence: the
generosity of maximum unemployment benefits a worker is
entitled to after job loss. We focus on this feature because it can
be easily operationalized and compared across states, and because
it reflects the comprehensiveness of the programme as a whole.
Other components of the programme are important but they are
difficult to operationalize in a comparable way across states. While
the impact of the programme will also depend on benefit uptake,
the latter is determined by individual characteristics that may be
correlated with health. In contrast, changes in state benefit
generosity are in principle uncorrelated with individual charac-
teristics, which provides a potential natural experiment to assess
the impact of benefit generosity on health.
To achieve this aim, we linked individual-level data from the
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to yearly state-level data on
maximum unemployment benefit laws to test the hypotheses that
more generous unemployment benefits are associated with lower
incidence of first and recurrent CVD in the US population as well
as among unemployed workers. To control for differences across
states, we estimated the effect of changes in the generosity of
unemployment benefits on CVD risk using state-fixed effect
models.
Methods
The HRS study was approved by the University of Michigan
human subjects committee. The current report describes second-
ary analyses of de-identified data and is therefore exempt from
human subjects review. State of residence data, used in the current
analysis, is considered a restricted data element, and special data
security protocols are in place for these data; these security
protocols were approved by the Harvard School of Public Health
human subjects committee.
Sample
The HRS is a longitudinal survey of US adults aged 50 and
older and their spouses. Additional study details are available
elsewhere[25]. The HRS sample was selected using a multi-stage
area probability sample design of the US population, with
enrolment staggered by birth cohort. We used cohort members
enrolled in 1992 (Original HRS cohort, age-eligible born 1931–
1941), 1998 (‘‘War Babies’’ born from 1942–47), and 2004 (‘‘Early
Baby Boomers’’ born from 1948–1953). Response rates were high
and ranged from 70% for the 1942 to 1947 birth cohort enrolled
in 1998, to a high of 82% for the 1931 to 1941 birth cohort
enrolled in 1992, without major differences by demographic
factors. The majority of baseline interviews were face-to-face.
Biennial interviews (or proxy interviews for decedent participants)
were conducted through 2010, with wave-to-wave retention rates
of around 90%. The study sample included all HRS participants
aged 50–65 at some point between 1992 and 2010. From a total of
17,169 eligible participants, 182 were excluded because of missing
information on state of residence or because they lived in one of
five states with less than 50 individuals in the sample (Alaska,
Hawaii, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Vermont). We excluded
49 participants with missing information on CVD, 753 partici-
pants with missing information on state of residence prior to the
assessment of CVD, and 77 participants with missing information
on other covariates. The total sample analyzed included 16,108
participants.
Cardiovascular disease
CVD was defined as any stroke or heart disease (incident or
recurring) based on self-reports of a physician’s diagnosis in the
two-year period preceding interview. New enrollees were asked
whether a doctor had ever told them that they had had a heart
attack, coronary heart disease, angina, congestive heart failure, or
other heart problems. Participants were separately asked the same
question regarding stroke. To assess incidence of new events,
participants –or their proxies for deceased members, typically
spouses -were asked every two years whether they had had a new
diagnosis since last interview.
Unemployment Insurance Policy: Maximum
unemployment benefits
Income benefits received during an unemployment spell are
correlated with factors potentially associated with health such as
employment histories, previous earnings, and earlier unemploy-
ment spells. Therefore, the association between individual benefit
receipt and CVD does not reflect the causal impact of
unemployment benefits but is confounded by selection into
unemployment and benefit claiming. Instead of using individual-
level unemployment income received during unemployment spells,
we collected data on the maximum unemployment benefits
residents would be entitled to receive during unemployment spells
according to the unemployment laws in their state of residence.
The rationale for this approach is that maximum benefits
influence the amount of benefits individuals will ultimately receive
during an unemployment spell, but they are not influenced by
individual’s health as they are the result of state policy changes.
Although this approach does not enable us to assess the direct
impact of receiving benefits on CVD, it enables us to assess the
impact of changes in unemployment benefit policies on CVD risk.
Unemployment Benefits and Cardiovascular Disease
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unemployment benefits individuals are entitled to receive were
obtained from the US Department of Labor (http://www.oui.
doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp, accessed July 2010). The
maximum unemployment benefit was defined as the maximum
monthly benefit (in dollars) multiplied by the maximum number of
months a worker who becomes unemployed through no fault of
their own would be entitled to receive. The amount is specific for
each state and year. The actual unemployment income received
by an individual who becomes unemployed depends on his or her
salary while employed, the duration of prior employment, and the
duration of unemployment. In order to avoid selection bias due to
these and other variables, we used unemployment benefit
entitlements at the state level, rather than the actual benefits
received by each individual.
To account for price changes, all amounts were adjusted to
2006 US dollars using the consumer price index (CPI). In order to
account for non-linear effects of maximum benefits, we used the
natural logarithm of maximum benefits (log(maximum benefits/
1000 USD2006)) as the main independent variable.
Covariates
All models controlled for age, gender, respondent’s years of
education, mother’s educational attainment (.8 years, ,
=8years), father’s educational attainment (.8 years, ,=8years),
race (white, African American, other), Hispanic ethnicity, and
time-varying marital status (married, separated/divorced, wid-
owed, and never married). Missing values for marital status were
imputed by carrying forward the last known value, which was
typically not further than two years. In addition, we included an
indicator variable for year of CVD assessment to account for
secular trends in CVD incidence rates. Previous evidence
suggested important health differences between HRS participants
who were able to report on the education of their parents and
those who did not know their parents’ education, probably
reflecting whether the respondent lived with both of his/her
parents in childhood. For parental education, we therefore created
a missing category (‘‘unknown parents’ education’’). Employment
status was assessed each wave by asking participants whether they
were employed, unemployed, retired, disabled, or out of the labor
force. Lagged employment status was used in all models to assure
that it preceded the onset of cardiovascular disease and fell in the
same time spell as the maximum unemployment benefits.
Estimation Methods
We used Generalized Estimation Equations (GEE) to model
CVD as a function of employment status, state maximum
unemployment benefits and confounders. Models used a logit link
and an unstructured working correlation matrix to account for
repeated measures across waves. Because the HRS study is
nationally representative the corresponding sampling weights were
applied. In order to account for the possible time lag necessary for
income benefits to influence CVD risk, we related CVD diagnoses
at each wave to unemployment benefits in the preceding wave,
approximately two years earlier. The analysis was conducted in
five steps. We first modeled CVD as a function of lagged state
maximum unemployment income benefits adjusting for confound-
ers but without state fixed effects. This model exploits variation in
unemployment benefits across states. In the next set of models, we
adjusted for US census regional division (Midwest, Northeast,
South, and West). In the third model, we included state fixed
effects to control for all time-invariant differences across states.
The major advantage of fixed effects methods[26] is that by
differencing out variability within states, it is possible to control for
all time-invariant differences across states (characteristics that vary
across states but not over time). In the final model, we included
information on within state changes in percentage of high school
graduates, real average income, and the unemployment rate for
person between 30–64 years of age in addition to state-level fixed
effects.
To assess whether benefits mitigate the impact of unemploy-
ment on CVD, we implemented models that incorporated an
interaction between state-specific maximum unemployment ben-
efit and employment status. In sensitivity analyses, we examined
alternative lag periods between the unemployment benefits and
CVD rates.
Results
Out of 17,169 eligible participants, 16,108 had complete data
for at least one wave (Table 1). Of 12,482 CVD events reported
between 1994 and 2010, 4,218 were first diagnoses. Participants
had a median age of 55 (inter quartile range (IQR): 52–57 years)
when first interviewed. Over half (55%) were female, and the
median years of schooling were 12 (IQR: 12–14.5).
The median maximum income benefit (in 2006 US dollars) an
individual was entitled to receive if unemployed was US$8,840
(IQR: US$7,770–US$10,460). However, there were large differ-
ences across states. For example, in 1992, there was a three-fold
difference in the benefit level between Alabama (US$3,900) and
Massachusetts (US$13,320). Large variations were also evident in
the evolution of benefits over time. Figure 1 shows the percentage
change in maximum unemployment benefits in each US state
between 1992 and 2008. During this period, many states reduced
maximum unemployment benefits, while some states increased
benefits. Only a few states maintained constant unemployment
benefit levels. To illustrate (in 2006 USD), Arizona reduced
unemployment benefits from US$ 6,537 in 1992 to US$ 5.843 in
2008, while Massachusetts increased benefits from US$19.140 in
1992 to US$25,282 in 2008.
Table 2 summarizes results of models examining the impact of
unemployment benefits on CVD incidence. Female gender,
younger age, higher educational level and Hispanic ethnicity were
associated with reduced odds of CVD events. In models that did
not include state-fixed effects (model 1), an 1% increase in the two-
year lagged value of maximum unemployment benefits was
associated with reduced odds of CVD (Odds Ratio (OR)=0.82,
95%-Confidence Interval (CI): 0.71–0.94). This association was
virtually unchanged in models that incorporated US census region
divisions. However, incorporating state fixed effects, the associa-
tion between state unemployment benefits and CVD risk
disappeared (model 3, OR=1.0.2, 0.79–1.31). Adding time-
changing state level variables, namely percentage of high school
graduates, real average income, and unemployment among the
working age population, had very little impact on the estimated
effect of benefits on CVD incidence (model 4, OR=1.04, 0.77,
1.39). In sensitivity analyses, we assessed whether results were
sensitive to the lag period used to define exposure to unemploy-
ment benefit laws. Estimates based on contemporaneous as well as
four- and six-year lagged levels of unemployment benefits were
very similar to original estimates based on a two-year lag (results
not shown), suggesting that changes in maximum unemployment
benefits were not associated with CVD risk. We furthermore tested
different correlation structures (autoregressive, exchangeable) and
found very similar results to those based on the unstructured
correlation matrix used in our analyses (results not shown).
Table 3 shows results of models that incorporate an interaction
between individual employment status and state benefit levels at
Unemployment Benefits and Cardiovascular Disease
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Mean/n SD/%
N 16108
Maximum unemployment benefit 61000 (2006 USD) 9.28 (0.02)
Age in Years 54.9 (0.02) (0.02)
Gender (female) 8845 (54.9%)
Years of Education 12.46 (0.02)
Race
White 12568 (78.2%)
African American 2688 (16.7%)
Other 852 (5.3%)
Ethnicity
Non-Hispanic 14524 (90.2%)
Hispanic 1584 (9.8%)
Mother’s Education
Missing 1542 (9.6%)
.8years 5780 (35.9%)
,=8years 8786 (54.5%)
Father’s Education
Missing 2362 (14.6%)
.8years 6323 (39.3%)
,=8years 7423 (46.1%)
Marital Status
Missing 740 (4.6%)
Married 11270 (70.0%)
Never Married 664 (4.1%)
Widowed 862 (5.4%)
Separated/Divorced 2571 (16.0%)
Work Status
Missing 687 (4.3%)
Employed 10532 (65.4%)
Unemployed 408 (2.5%)
Retired 2281 (14.2%)
Disabled 697 (4.3%)
Not in Labor Force 1503 (9.3%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0101193.t001
Figure 1. Percentage change in maximum unemployment compensation benefits (adjusted for differences in prices) in US states
between 1992 and 2008.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0101193.g001
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at least one unemployment spell. Unemployment was unrelated to
the risk of first or recurrent CVD, and there was no significant
interaction between employment status and changes in state
income benefits (p=0.35). In sensitivity analyses, we also
examined interactions with educational level, but found no
evidence of an effect of income benefits across individuals with
different levels of education (p=0.79) (Table 3, model 3).
Discussion
We hypothesized that increased unemployment compensation
benefits would confer health benefits for employed workers and
their families by providing a sense of security, and it would reduce
the impact of unemployment on CVD risk. Although states with
more benefits had lower incidence of CVD, incorporating state-
fixed effects, we find no significant association between changes in
state unemployment benefits and CVD risk.
A possible explanation for this finding is that our study focuses
on a sample of individuals 50 years and older. Although late-life
unemployment is associated with poorer health[10], the effects of
unemployment, and the potentially ameliorating impact of
unemployment benefits, may be weaker in mature workers who
have already established careers and accumulated financial
resources[27–28]. As a consequence, older individuals may be
less dependent on unemployment benefit provisions, as opposed to
younger workers who have accumulated less wealth and may rely
more on unemployment benefit provisions. On the other hand,
recent evidence suggests that Americans in their 50’s who became
unemployed during the recent recession lost more of their monthly
per-capita earnings than any other age group [29]. Furthermore,
older workers are among the highest beneficiaries of unemploy-
ment benefits. During the recent recession, 59% of long-term
unemployed workers aged 50–51 and 46% of those aged 62+ were
receiving unemployment benefits, compared to 53% of workers
35–49 and 41% of workers 25–34. This suggests that unemploy-
ment benefits are disproportionately claimed by unemployed older
workers. Nevertheless future studies should examine whether
unemployment benefits may confer health benefits for younger
workers.
In addition, unemployment benefits in the US are characterized
by relatively low recipiency rates. Low recipiency might explain
the lack of a statistically significant effect in our study. In 2005, for
example, only 51% of job losers applied for UI benefits, but rates
increase sharply with age: Among men aged 16–24, only 29% of
job losers claimed UI benefits in 2005, compared to 60% of job
losers aged 45 or older[30]. Low recipiency is systematically linked
to variables that reflect UI statutes and administrative operations
as well as differences in features of state labor markets such as
unionization. This results in large variations in WBTU (weekly UI
beneficiaries as a proportion of weekly unemployment) across
states. For instance, long run averages of WBTU for the years
1967 to 1998 ranged from 0.16 in Florida and Virginia to .56 in
Alaska[31].
Over the last decades, several studies have suggested that
unemployment is associated with a variety of health outcomes
including mortality, suicide, myocardial infarction, stroke, disabil-
ity and long-term illness[4,10,32–38]. Several mechanisms have
been proposed to explain these associations. Unemployment is
associated with a substantial loss in earnings[39], but it may also
influence health via several non-financial pathways such as chronic
stress, reduced social interaction, decreased self-esteem and social
recognition[4], and increased prevalence of smoking, drinking and
physical inactivity[40]. The fact that we find no evidence that
changes in state unemployment benefit policies influence CVD
risk suggest that, at ages 50 and above, unemployment may
influence CVD risk through some of these non-financial mecha-
nisms, so that other policies than unemployment benefits may be
more important in preventing CVD incidence. On the other hand,
our results are at odds with previous evidence that among US
elderly, an increase in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
cash transfer program benefits is associated with a fall of 0.46
percentage points in the rate of disability among US adults aged
65 and older.[41] A possible explanation for this discrepancy is
that CVD risk is less sensitive to temporary income support
benefits than other outcomes such as physical disability and mental
health. Our models examined relatively short-term effects of state
changes in unemployment benefits. The development of heart
disease and stroke is a function of cumulative risk exposure
throughout the life-course, and may involve long etiologic periods.
Lower unemployment benefits during the critical years of work
below age 50 may thus be more important in the development of
cardiovascular risk later on in life, while benefit levels at older ages
may be less important. Future studies should assess whether life-
time cumulative exposure to different levels of unemployment
compensation benefits throughout earlier career years may have
cumulative effects on CVD risk, which only manifest many years
or decades later.
Limitations of our study
As one of the first study to evaluate the impact of unemploy-
ment benefit policies on health in the US, conclusions from our
study should be interpreted with caution. We do not have medical
verification of CVD events. This may have introduced bias if CVD
reporting varied in tandem with state unemployment benefit
policies. However, we have previously shown that CVD incidence
as measured in HRS compares well with incidence estimates from
clinically verified studies[42]. Assignment of unemployment
benefits for each individual was based on maximum unemploy-
ment benefit eligibility in the state of residence for a given year.
We therefore did not estimate the direct effect of receiving benefits
among the unemployed. Instead, our study assessed the impact of
changes in unemployment maximum benefit policies on CVD
incidence. This approach has the advantage of overcoming bias
due to selection into unemployment, as well as illustrating the
potential impact of changes in policy. However, because only a
small fraction of the sample actually became unemployed and was
eligible for unemployment benefits, our estimates may mask larger
effects of benefits among those actually receiving unemployment
benefits.
Another limitation is that this study exploits year to year
variations in the generosity of unemployment benefits among older
Americans only. It studies the estimates the short-term effects of
unemployment and unemployment benefit generosity on cardio-
vascular disease, rather than the long-term effects where other
have identified significant effects of involuntary job loss on
myocardial infarction and stroke in this study sample[9–10].
Our findings cannot be translated to long-term effects or to a
younger age group and both merit additional scientific investiga-
tion.
A main strength of our approach is the introduction of state-
fixed effects, to control for time-invariant differences across states.
The drawback of this approach is that we are only able to exploit
within-state variations in unemployment benefit level over time.
Because differences across states are much larger than differences
over time within states, our identification strategy relies on
medium to small changes in benefits during the study period. It is
therefore possible that the changes in unemployment benefits
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PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 July 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 7 | e101193during the study period were not sufficiently large to substantially
affect CVD risk.
A further potential bias would arise if maximum unemployment
benefits in a state changed in tandem with other secular changes.
For example, unemployment benefits may have been extended in
some states in response to increasing unemployment rates. If
economic downturns are associated with higher CVD risk, this
would underestimate the health benefits of unemployment
compensation. To test this hypothesis, we incorporated in the
models state-level unemployment rates for each year and
experimented with a one-year lag with respect to the unemploy-
ment benefit levels (results not shown). The association between
state-level unemployment benefits and cardiovascular disease risk
remained unaffected, suggesting that this did not explain our
results.
Conclusion
Our study illustrates the potential of linking state-level policies
to individual-level data to examine their impact on health. Our
results suggest that changes in the generosity of maximum
unemployment compensation benefits did not affect the risk of
CVD in a sample of old American workers. Future studies should
examine whether state unemployment benefits may influence
other health outcomes more sensitive to financial strain in the
short-term, or whether changes in policy at younger ages might be
more important in shaping cardiovascular risk at older ages.
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